By: Valerie Brankovic
Explicating the Proposal
The psychological challenges faced by families of the missing “undermine relationships among communities” and prevent the social fabric from healing for post-conflict states.[1] This paper recommends that Kosovo authorities implement a two-pronged strategy to address the unique challenges posed by families’ ambiguous loss. First, Kosovo’s government should renew its recognition of the plight of families of the missing. Second, the government and civil society should work together to provide targeted psychological interventions for families. These interventions should be informed by theories of ambiguous loss.[2] Kosovo officials have made good-faith efforts to recognize the problem of missing persons.[3] However, a renewed strategy that combines different strands of state action and international assistance represents a next-best path forward for Kosovo, in the absence of cooperation on the part of the Serbian government.
Program models and practices from other countries have shown promising results for families of the missing. Even though the other country examples differ from Kosovo, the generally positive results offer useful reference points for Kosovo to carry out the two-pronged strategy recommended above.
I. Renewed Acknowledgment of Families’ Pain by Government Authorities Would Have Psychological Benefits
The official acknowledgment of traumatic events can have a healing effect on impacted populations. Traumas such as ethnic cleansing or a genocide, for instance, may “create victims across generations”[4] and “fundamentally alter[]” the demographics and culture of targeted groups.[5] A government’s recognition of that suffering–even if the government itself did not carry out the relevant acts[6]–may help demonstrate national commitments to rule of law, accountability, and preventing the recurrence of violence.[7] By offering formal recognition of a community’s trauma, a government also telegraphs to the global community its prioritization of human rights.[8]
One recent example comes from the United States’ official recognition in 2021 of the Armenian Genocide.[9] President Biden’s acknowledgment in April 2021 came exactly 106 years after the start of the genocide, when Ottoman authorities began a campaign of terror against the Armenian population that claimed the lives of approximately one and a half million people.[10] “Armenians were killed by soldiers and police, or died of starvation and exhaustion” while marching to concentration camps in modern-day Syria and Iraq.[11] In addition to widespread death and destruction, the violence also claimed important Armenian religious and cultural artifacts.[12] The Turkish government, as the “modern-day successor of the Ottoman Empire,”[13] has long denied the scale of human atrocities and targeted destruction of Armenian cultural relics.[14] The President’s statement had strong personal meaning for Armenians and Armenian Americans for whom the genocide is a “‘primary identity marker.’”[15] Observers described U.S. recognition as a “relief” and indicative of a U.S. commitment to heal the wounds of the past.[16] One activist, Simon Maghakyan, noted that the recognition could help address intergenerational trauma within Armenian communities.[17] The acknowledgment also held symbolic meaning for “other victimized people” beyond the Armenian diaspora.[18] Official recognition of the genocide signaled that other “acts of inhumanity will not go unacknowledged.”[19] One analysis noted that the formal recognition would also have practical benefits for civil society organizations, by enabling them to “expand communication and dialogue on ways to achieve justice.”[20]
Another example of the power of official recognition comes from the Japanese American redress movement in the decades after the detention of Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, American fears of “a Japanese invasion and subversive acts by Japanese-Americans prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to sign Executive Order 9066,” which prompted the removal of over 110,000 people of Japanese descent from their homes.[21] Beginning in 1942, “a total of 10 camps were opened, holding approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans for varying periods of time.”[22] One observer described the camps as “concentration camps” due to the “terrible” living conditions.[23] Another account referred to the camps as “[p]rison-like compounds,” often located in the desert, “dotted with watchtowers and surrounded by barbed wire.”[24] In addition to detainees’ deprival of due process, individuals also lacked access to health care[25] and in many cases had their property repossessed by white Americans.[26] Although the U.S. government eventually closed the internment camps in 1945, “[t]he Japanese American relocation program had significant consequences” for the Japanese American community.[27]
In the decades that followed, Japanese American activists sought recognition and reparations from the government.[28] Activists’ years of advocacy eventually culminated with several legislative milestones, including the 1982 establishment of a presidential commission to study the motivating factors behind the federal government’s racially motivated relocation program.[29] Later, the commission officially recognized the “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership as the underlying causes” of the detention policy.[30] Six years later, in 1988, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act, awarding more than 80,000 former incarcerees $20,000 to “compensate them for the ordeal they had suffered.”[31] The compensation package also included a formal apology by then-President George H.W. Bush for the government’s policy toward Japanese Americans.[32] Recipients of the apology letter reported positive psychological benefits as a result of their suffering being brought into public view.[33] Notably, letter recipients also reported that the acknowledgment of their plight—though it had taken place decades earlier—helped restore their trust in the U.S. government.[34]
II. Psychological Interventions in Other Countries Show Benefits for Families of the Missing
Stress-related health consequences affect the families of missing persons more than they do others, including those who know with finality that their loved one is dead.[35] Targeted interventions are thus needed, such as the Hateymalo Accompaniment Program implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Nepal.[36] The program was carried out over six years between 2010 and 2016 and addressed the disappearances resulting from the 1996-2006 conflict between Maoist guerilla fighters and the Kathmandu government.[37] During the war, more than 10,000 people were killed and over 1,300 were reported missing.[38]
As part of the Program, the ICRC provided skills training to non-professional and volunteer “accompaniers” that enabled them to directly assist and counsel impacted families in their own communities.[39] Trained in the unique difficulties of ambiguous loss, accompaniers facilitated events such as “support group sessions for wives, mothers, fathers and children of the families of the missing.”[40] During these sessions, families had an opportunity to “share their common suffering and grief” over repeated meetings.[41] In addition to coordinating direct services, the Hateymalo Program provided information and referrals for families of the missing.[42] Accompaniers kept families abreast of changes to government aid policies and helped families obtain official documents, such as birth certificates, and fill out forms for government benefits.[43] Family members requiring additional psychological support were also able to receive referrals to mediation services and specialized providers.[44]
Outside of the direct services component of the program, ICRC also served an important intermediary function through its communications with local authorities.[45] On behalf of families of the missing, ICRC “conduct[ed] field visits” to gather information on cases of missing individuals and clarify the fate of the person when possible.[46]
According to a subsequent report on the program’s long-term results, participants benefited significantly from the psychological interventions.[47] Family members reduced their rate of “psychological distress” by nearly half compared to their baseline values before their participation in the program.[48] “Levels of individual distress, recorded in terms of anxiety, depression, and psychosomatic complaints declined greatly” throughout the program.[49] Families also reported higher levels of daily functioning and access to social support.[50] Critically, in a follow-up survey of program participants conducted four years after the program ended, participants reported that the psychological benefits of the program were lasting.[51]
The ICRC implemented a similar program in Sri Lanka in 2014 and 2015.[52] Like the Nepal program, the Sri Lanka program trained volunteer accompaniers to provide group discussion sessions for family members of the missing and to conduct home visits with participants.[53] In addition to the psychosocial supports provided by accompaniers, ICRC also provided small cash grants to families of the missing to “cover their immediate needs,” and encouraged participants to start small businesses and boost their incomes.[54] Also, similar to the Nepal program, multiple family members participating in the group sessions reported feeling “relieved . . . of a heavy burden,”[55] and that they had formed close bonds with other participants.[56]
III. Application to Kosovo
Formal recognition of families’ ambiguous grief by Kosovo authorities would be valuable, even though the Kosovo government does not itself bear full responsibility for all missing persons.[57] Although the subject of missing persons is often acknowledged by Kosovo authorities, the issue is frequently politicized as a source of tension with Serbia, rather than as part of a constructive effort to meet the psychological needs of families.[58] Indeed, the unique challenges of ambiguous grief for families of the missing are seldom mentioned, if ever, in official statements. Kosovo is unique in that it is the only Balkan country in which the international community comprehensively oversees efforts to find missing persons. Kosovar institutions have steadily assumed greater responsibility for these efforts; publicly taking ownership over the problem and acknowledging families’ pain could strengthen confidence in the Kosovo government and provide greater clarity on the status of missing persons work, amid serious politicization of the problem.
To the second prong of the recommendation, Kosovo should look to the examples of Sri Lanka’s and Nepal’s Accompaniment Programs and enact a system of psychological reparations for families of the missing. The program were designed to acknowledge the particular issue of ambiguous loss; ICRC officials did not set out to conduct exhumations or grave sites or make any promises regarding the return of lost family members’ remains. By helping families of the missing cope with ambiguous loss, the interventions created pathways out of stagnant feelings of helplessness and their social isolation. In both Sri Lanka and Nepal , the ICRC was responsible for designing and implementing the psychological interventions together with local NGOs. Kosovo could—and should—enact a similar model. The ICRC maintains a presence in Kosovo,[59] but, to the best of the author’s knowledge, has not implemented the same type of holistic Accompaniment Program in Kosovo. The available sources do not shed much light on why this is; however, the ICRC and its partners note that the Accompaniment Programs required significant financial and staffing outlays.[60] Limited finances may therefore be the reason the ICRC did not roll out the same program in Kosovo.
The central thesis of this article is that, in a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of addressing the psychological needs of families of the missing outweigh the costs. In addition, Kosovo authorities should act sooner, rather than later, to meet the needs of these families. Taking immediate action will help resolve families’ ambiguous loss, while helping prevent the recurrence of social discontent and unrest.
With these arguments in mind, the ICRC—or another international body or donor—should enact the same program of psychological supports for eligible family members of the missing. Like the programs in Sri Lanka or Nepal, a program in Kosovo should include a series of group discussions aimed at bringing together families of the missing, while providing a forum for participants to voice their grievances. Another beneficial aspect of the Sri Lankan and Nepalese programs was the referral service that helped connect program participants with government benefits, support for complex grief, and free legal aid. Families of the missing in Kosovo would likely benefit in similar ways as the program participants in Sri Lanka and Nepal.[61]
Addressing Critiques
Implementing the strategy outlined above has the possibility to generate controversy. After all, the subject matter of missing persons—especially among families of the missing—is a highly sensitive and personal matter. Any solution enacted by government or civil society organizations purporting to address the issue would likely be met with scrutiny, because any system of reparations comes with a price tag.
This paper attempts to address likely critiques of the strategy outlined supra, which—if past is prologue—may center on the proposal that Kosovo pursue its own system of psychological reparations, without assistance from Serbia. Other anticipated critiques include the use of psychological reparations, as opposed to a simpler cash payment system, as well as the possible perception that psychological reparations are viewed as a paternalistic (and therefore unwelcome) strategy to the problem of missing persons in Kosovo.
To the first point, critics could question the wisdom of Kosovo proceeding unilaterally in its effort to locate the remaining missing persons.[62] Critics of a unilateral strategy could argue that a diplomatic solution would be preferable to Kosovo moving forward by itself to deliver closure to families of the missing. Such a solution might even produce higher quality information regarding missing persons for their families because the information (which could come from Serbia’s wartime archives) might provide accurate details as to the cause of death and the location of the missing person’s remains. In an ideal world, a completely open system of information-sharing between Kosovo and Serbia would be the best way for families of the missing to obtain information. But, as discussed, Kosovar and Serbian officials remain tangled in negotiations over information about the remaining missing persons, and particularly those remains located in Serbia.[63] This writing does not suggest ending diplomatic efforts with Serbia altogether but instead recommends that Kosovo authorities focus on making more immediate progress with missing persons and achieving some measure of closure for families. The recommendation that Kosovo proceed unilaterally only recognizes that if delivering relief for impacted families is a priority, then a targeted and localized system of psychological supports is likely to yield faster results at the individual level than any current diplomatic efforts could.
A second critique might question the adequacy of psychological reparations for families of the missing. Of course, no programmatic service could fully fill the chasm left by a missing family member who is likely presumed dead, nor could a cash payment of any amount be a sufficient replacement. To that critique, this paper argues that a scheme of psychological reparations would not profess to fully “solve” the issue of a missing person, but to offer some amount of progress, where little has been made over the past two decades.[64] Indeed, the slow—and declining—pace of progress could itself have negative consequences for families of the missing.[65] Families who have waited decades for information on their loved ones will continue to face indefinite periods of waiting if Kosovo continues along its current path.[66] Over time, the number of surviving family members of the missing will decrease, thereby leaving unresolved grief that could be passed along to future generations.[67] Intergenerational trauma could have severely negative impacts for the country more broadly.[68] Without addressing the problem of missing persons, too, Kosovo may leave itself open to the recurrence of conflict, either within the country or with Serbia.
For this reason, it is especially important for Kosovo to undertake a tangible effort to assist the families of the missing. Families’ participation in these programs may itself be empowering and provide a greater sense of control in the face of ambiguous loss.[69] The evidence from the ICRC programs attests to this.[70] As a strategy, psychological reparations offer an attainable “something” for families. This paper previously noted that Kosovo is well-equipped to undertake this effort, too, with multiple international NGOs already based in the country and a government that understands how to work with international and local civil society partners to deliver services to vulnerable groups.
The third critique is that a system of psychological reparations may be viewed as paternalistic, because the system (at least the one envisioned here) would be primarily led by an international NGO.[71] However, as noted in the earlier discussion of why initiatives like the Hateymalo Program have been impactful for affected groups, this paper argues that local partnerships with established civil society organizations and known community leaders would be critical to the success of psychological reparations. Indeed, local actors would probably be the “boots on the ground” of any such program, as trusted figures would be essential toward securing the trust of families of the missing as the families navigate a sensitive topic. Furthermore, local organizations would provide culturally and historically relevant information that would serve to improve the service delivery model of psychological services to families. Because Kosovo is familiar with the presence of international NGOs,[72] the perception of psychological reparations as paternalistic could be offset by a partnership approach to the program.
Finally, critics may argue that a cash reparations system would be simpler and offer relatively “quick” closure for impacted families.[73] This assertion certainly has truth to it; individuals who have experienced harm during violent conflicts often seek cash reparations specifically as a way to ease the burden of their losses.[74] However, as this paper previously discussed, the missing persons problem in Kosovo defies straightforward solutions,[75] especially due to the complications of ambiguous loss.[76] This paper does not rule out a system of cash reparations as a potentially helpful strategy for families, but so far, cash reparations schemes in Kosovo—particularly for conflict-associated harms—have not proven successful.[77] Because such an effort has stalled, and because further delaying meaningful resolution for families of the missing could have harmful downstream effects for Kosovar society,[78] this article would respond to that critique by suggesting cash reparations, if deemed necessary, should serve as an ancillary program component, instead of as the primary mechanism for reparations. That is, this writing recommends a strategy that centers psychological reparations, as opposed to cash reparations, but could envision a system where both strategies work in tandem.[79]
In sum, this section anticipates several critiques to the recommended system of psychological reparations but argues that each critique can be overcome with the practicality and flexibility that the two-pronged system proposed here would provide.
Conclusion
Kosovo, like other post-conflict states, faces serious challenges in finding its wartime missing persons. Due to the long process required to exhume and identify missing persons, many families go decades without gaining real closure on the fate of their loved ones. This complex form of trauma can foment serious consequences for impacted individuals, as well as for Kosovar society as a whole. Because Kosovo requires further cooperation with Serbia to fully address this problem, Kosovar authorities should focus on using levers it can control internally—such as making government statements and working with already-existing NGO structures in the country—to address the needs of affected families. The best way to do this is through a two-pronged strategy of (1) official government recognition and (2) psychological reparations for families of the missing. As demonstrated in various country examples, such steps taken by governments of other states can be extremely impactful for individuals and have positive effects for society, as well, maybe even including the prevention of future conflict. Fair critiques may be leveled at these recommendations, but the flexibility and practicality of psychological reparations could help overcome these concerns.
[1] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Missing persons and their families 1 (2015) (downloadable report on file with author).
[2] See supra Section I.3.
[3] See supra Section I.4.
[4] Lauren Baillie, Why Biden’s Recognition of the Armenian Genocide Is Significant, U.S. Inst. of Peace (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/why-bidens-recognition-armenian-genocide-significant.
[5] Id.
[6] See id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Madeline Roache, What Biden’s Recognition of Armenian Genocide Means to Armenian-Americans, Time (Apr. 27, 2021, 2:55 PM), https://time.com/5959135/biden-armenia-genocide.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Roache, supra note 109.
[17] Id.
[18] See id.
[19] Emily Priborkin, 5 Reasons Why Biden’s Recognition of the Armenian Genocide Is Significant, Am. Univ. Sch. Int’l Service (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20210426-5-reasons-why-bidens-recognition-of-the-armenian-genocide-is-significant.cfm.
[20] Id.
[21] Ansel Adams’s Photographs of Japanese-American Internment at Manzanar, About this Collection, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/collections/ansel-adams-manzanar/about-this-collection (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).
[22] Japanese American Internment, Encyc. Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Japanese-American-internment (last visited Sept. 8, 2024).
[23] Japanese American Incarceration, World War II Museum, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japanese-american-incarceration (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).
[24] Immigration and Relocation in U.S. History, Behind the Wire, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/immigration/japanese/behind-the-wire (last visited Sept. 8, 2024).
[25] Id.
[26] Encyc. Britannica, supra note 121.
[27] World War II Museum, supra note 122.
[28] See Encyc. Britannica, supra note 121.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Redress and Reparations for Japanese American Incarceration, World War II Museum (Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/redress-and-reparations-japanese-american-incarceration.
[34] Id. For a personal account of the impact of the U.S. government’s apology, see Kamna Shastri, Japanese American Redress and African American Reparations Intertwined, South Seattle Emerald (Apr. 7, 2021), https://southseattleemerald.com/2021/04/07/japanese-american-redress-and-african-american-reparations-intertwined (“When Satsuki Ina’s mother received her reparations check from the US government in apology for incarcerating over 120,000 Japanese Americans between 1942 and 1945, the check ended up somewhere in a stack of papers piled high on her desk. Instead, a framed apology letter leaning against the wall caught Ina’s eye. ‘What does this mean for you?’ Ina asked her mother. ‘I feel like I finally got my face back,’ her mother replied.”).
[35] See Isuru, Bandumithra & Williams, supra note 9. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Hateymalo Accompaniment Program: ICRC’s Comprehensive Psychosocial Support Program to the Families of Missing Persons in Nepal 11 (2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/nepal-hateymalo-program-2014.pdf [hereinafter Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2014)]. For a quantitative look at the mindset of Nepalese families of the missing, see the subsequent ICRC report on the Nepal Hataymalo Accompaniment Program. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Hateymalo Accompaniment Programme: ICRC’s Comprehensive Psychosocial Support Program to the Families of Missing Persons in Nepal 2010-2016, 6 (2016) (“Altogether 83% of the families reported that they need a dead body or evidence of death to perform the missing person’s final rites. . . . Uncertainty about the fate of a relative can, if not treated properly, result in the development of many symptoms of distress, including feelings of guilt, self-blame, and anger; loss of interest in important areas of life; intra-family disputes; and even suicidal thoughts. . . . Intensive questions and comments [by others] regarding the disappearances; discrimination by peers, teachers, and community members; and teasing by and isolation from peers contributed to [children family members’] distress.”) [hereinafter Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2016)].
[36] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2016), supra note 134, at 3. See Civil War in Nepal, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/civil-war-nepal (last visited Sept. 8, 2024).
[37] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2016), supra note 134, at 3.
[38] Id.
[39] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2014), supra note 134, at 6.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id. at 6, 10.
[44] Id. at 6.
[45] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2014), supra note 134, at 10.
[46] Id. at 10.
[47] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2016), supra note 134, at 3.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Families of the Missing Help Each Other 3 (2021), https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/Worldwide/asia/sri-lanka/210810_icrc_families_of_the_missing.pdf.
[53] Id. at 4.
[54] Id. at 5.
[55] Id. at 2.
[56] Id. at 7.
[57] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 13, at 12.
[58] Id. See supra, Section I.2.
[59] Supra Section I.4.
[60] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2016), supra note 134, at 3.
[61] Of course, Kosovo differs in key respects from Sri Lanka and Nepal, but this paper draws on the examples of the ICRC’s work in both countries to provide an example of an international organization that effectively collaborated with local partners to deliver culturally relevant services to families.
[62] See supra Section 1.2.
[63] See Haxhiaj, supra note 95.
[64] Supra Section 1.4.
[65] Bytyci, supra note 12.
[66] See id.
[67] See supra Section 1.3 (discussing the potential intergenerational impacts of ambiguous loss).
[68] See id.
[69] See Supra Section II.2.
[70] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (2016), supra note 134, at 3.
[71]170 See Supra Section II.2.
[72] See Supra Section I.4.
[73] The quotes around “quick” are used to acknowledge that families of the missing in Kosovo have already waited decades for resolution to their ambiguous loss.
[74] See, e.g., Peter Van der Auweraert, Int’l Org. for Migration, Reparations for Wartime Victims in the Former Yugoslavia: In Search of the Way Forward (2013), https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/migrated_files/What-We-Do/docs/Reparations-for-Wartime-Victimes-in-the-Former-Yugoslavia-In-Search-of-the-Way-Forward.pdf.
[75] See supra Section I.2 (discussing why political dynamics between Kosovo and Serbia make any near-term—and productive—solution on missing persons an unlikely proposition).
[76] Supra Section I.3.
[77] See Haxhiaj, supra note 95.
[78] See supra Section I.3.
[79] See supra Section II.1 (noting the success of the Japanese American redress movement, which secured both cash reparations as well as an official apology from the president).
