By: Valerie Brankovic

Introduction

More than 25 years after the conclusion in 1999 of the war between Serbia and Kosovo, an estimated 1,595 people remain missing due to wartime violence and enforced disappearances.^[1] Most of the missing are ethnic Albanians, although ethnic Serbs and some from the minority Roma are also included in that figure.^[2] Kosovo’s missing persons problem is not unique: violent conflicts frequently involve disappearances of individuals living in the impacted regions.^[3] Governments are often ill-equipped to prevent disappearances from occurring in the first place or to obtain information in the aftermath of a person’s disappearance and provide psychological support to the person’s family.^[4] Kosovo authorities and civil society organizations continue to make progress in conducting investigations and exhumations of mass graves.^[5] Despite Kosovo’s headway in this process, many families of the missing still lack resolution as to the fate of their loved ones.^[6] The fraught political relationship between Kosovo and Serbia is a major reason for this.^[7]

The complex and unresolved grief experienced by families of the missing creates unique issues of loss, referred to as “ambiguous loss” in the psychological literature on missing persons.^[8] Left to process emotions of unresolved loss, studies of post-conflict states show that family members of the missing remain “locked” in grief and exhibit reluctance to return to their daily lives and reengage with society.^[9] As this article argues, on a broader scale, a large number of unresolved missing persons cases could contribute to broader societal problems, such as a lack of social cohesion and loss of trust state institutions (especially where the state has taken limited action to locate missing individuals).

Twenty-five years after the end of the conflict, Kosovo faces these very problems.^[10] To squarely address these issues, Kosovo should institute a system of comprehensive psychological reparations for families of the missing. Such a system should aim to (1) restore public trust in the government among families of the missing; and (2) provide psychosocial supports informed by an understanding of ambiguous loss.^[11] This two-pronged strategy would be a feasible and valuable path forward for Kosovo authorities and civil society organizations to carry out in partnership with one another. Providing psychological reparations would not only help resolve families’ ambiguous loss, but would also generate positive externalities for Kosovar society and offer a positive example for the Balkans and other post-conflict states taking account of their missing.

This writing opens by providing a brief overview of the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo and outlines the scale of Kosovo’s missing persons problem. The next section discusses the unique trauma—ambiguous loss—experienced by those who mourn long-time missing persons and explains why resolving such profound loss serves both individual and societal well-being goals. This section also reflects on trends in Kosovo’s efforts to recover missing persons, a process that typically involves locating mass graves, exhuming human remains, and making identifications, as opposed to tracking down a missing person who is still living. (As a preliminary matter to the discussion that follows, this paper refers to families of the missing as those families who have not yet obtained resolution as to the fate of their family members, and not to families who have learned the fate of their family member or had the opportunity to bury their loved one.) The challenges associated with these resource-intensive efforts—most especially the troubled relationship between Kosovo and Serbia^[12]—fuel the argument that Kosovo should shift its strategy to find missing persons. Instead of continuing diplomatic efforts with Serbia, Kosovo must pursue this effort unilaterally and engage more immediate solutions to meet the psychological needs of affected families. To support this argument, the following section refers to recent political and programmatic examples from other countries to highlight a possible path forward for Kosovo. Following the discussion of solutions, this writing addresses counterarguments to these recommendations and suggests that these proposals would withstand a cost-benefit analysis.

The 1998-1999 Conflict in Kosovo

Between 1945 and 1991, Kosovo was the southernmost province of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.^[13] Under the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution, Kosovo maintained “substantial” independence as an autonomous province of Serbia, controlling its own legislature, judiciary, and administration, while maintaining membership in the federalist Yugoslavian Assembly.^[14] Although Kosovo was–and remains–a site of shared cultural and religious significance for multiple various groups over centuries, by the end of World War II, the population had become predominantly ethnic Albanian.^[15] Ethnic Serbs, however, continued to “view[] Kosovo as their cultural heartland,”^[16] leading to friction between Serbia and its then-southernmost province.

Ethnonationalist tensions flared in the 1980s as Kosovar Albanians increasingly called for independence from Serbia and the status of a republic within the Former Yugoslavia.^[17] The dispute reached a tipping point in 1989 when the Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milošević enacted measures curtailing Kosovo’s autonomy as it had been put forth under the 1974 Constitution.^[18] Kosovar Albanians responded to the Serbian government’s power grab with non-violent resistance tactics aimed at attaining independence.^[19] However, as the Former Yugoslavia “disintegrated” throughout the early 1990s, conflict grew between Serbia and Kosovo as Kosovo’s ethnic Serbian population fought to retain part of Serbia and ethnic Albanians continued their push for independence.^[20]

By the mid-1990s, in a departure from the non-violent strategies that characterized Kosovar Albanians’ earlier pursuit of independence, Kosovar Albanians—represented by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—increasingly began using political violence against Yugoslav forces.^[21] In response, Yugoslav forces escalated their attacks on the KLA.^[22] The repeated clashes soon ripened into armed conflict beginning on March 5, 1998.^[23] Armed conflict between Yugoslav and KLA forces “was characterized by ethnic cleansing and the destruction of property,” resulting in massive population displacement^[24] and over 13,500 individuals killed and missing.^[25] After diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict faltered, and “in the face of an escalating humanitarian crisis,” NATO initiated an “aerial bombing campaign” against Yugoslav and KLA forces starting in March 1999 and continuing through early June of that year.^[26]

On June 9, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) convened with the Yugoslav government and the Republic of Serbia to “conclude[] a Military Technical Agreement.”^[27] The agreement provided for a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, “and the deployment of a UN civilian presence and KFOR within Kosovo.”^[28] The following day, on June 10, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 placing Kosovo under a “transitional UN administration” bolstered by KFOR peacekeeping forces.^[29]

For the next nine years, Kosovo remained under UN authority, specifically, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).^[30] During this period, UNMIK worked to “promote security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo,”^[31] and strengthened Kosovo’s institutions and the rule of law in the aftermath of the conflict.^[32] In early 2008, fulfilling a decades-long effort, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia.^[33] Later that year, UNMIK transitioned its authority to the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which deployed resources across the fledgling nation to support its “path towards increased effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability . . . in full compliance with international human rights standards.”^[34]

To this day, EULEX plays a key role in supporting Kosovo’s post-conflict rebuilding, and the organization’s mandate directs EULEX to assist with finding missing persons.^[35]

Ambiguous Loss

Missing persons create unique issues of loss for the communities they leave behind.^[36] Psychological studies point to a phenomenon of “ambiguous loss” that occurs when families do not receive closure about the fate of their loved one.^[37] Unlike the grief accompanied by a person’s death where grieving rituals are possible, families who remain in the dark about whether their relative will return face especially complicated feelings of loss and uncertainty.^[38]

Like other post-conflict states, Kosovo faces numerous pressing concerns, including high unemployment, environmental degradation, a challenging political relationship with Serbia, and the emigration of younger individuals seeking economic opportunities in other countries.^[39] However, given the severity of the consequences for family members of the missing, Kosovo should dedicate additional resources to supporting these individuals in Kosovar society, even though such a policy decision necessarily comes at the expense of other objectives.

Kosovo should do this for two reasons. First, the massive trauma of having large numbers of missing persons in Kosovo may harm future generations if the situation is not adequately remedied.^[40] Second, and relatedly, failure to adequately address such profound trauma increases the potential for history to repeat itself; similar atrocities may occur again.^[41] To the first point, which is that missing persons trauma may contribute to intergenerational trauma, there is significant evidence that future generations carry forward the scars of their elders’ traumas.^[42]

As early as 1966, Canadian psychiatrist Vivian Rakoff documented “high rates of psychological distress among children of Holocaust survivors.”^[43] Researchers reported that Holocaust survivors themselves, as well as their children and grandchildren, live in “survival mode.”^[44] Of course, for Kosovo, the underlying facts of the conflict differ from the events of the Holocaust. However, the trauma faced by families of the missing may be similarly deep and long-lasting. Families living with the loss of a loved one exist “‘in an uninterrupted darkness.’”^[45] “Their anguish remains acute long after the conflict has ended,”^[46] and can lead to self-isolation. Unaffected community members may lack a script “to offer comfort”^[47] to families of the missing or understand their unique grief, thereby compounding families’ isolation and social exclusion.

In addition to the negative effects of unresolved missing persons cases on families, society may also be at risk for the recurrence of violence if a government fails to fully address the open wounds of a conflict—and, in this case, missing persons. One expert speaking in the context of genocide notes that post-conflict states must make an effort to engage with the reality of the conflict—specifically around truth-telling, bringing perpetrators to justice, and memorializing the conflict—to ensure the state does not leave itself open to the recurrence of similar conflicts.^[48] Applying that perspective to the context of missing persons, a government’s refusal or failure to meaningfully engage with a community’s serious issues of loss may essentially allow feelings of severe pain and victimization to fester among families of the missing. Given the ethnonationalist dimension to Kosovo’s inability to fully account for missing persons,^[49] it is possible that the primarily ethnic Albanian families of the missing may harbor feelings of hatred toward the primarily ethnic Serb perpetrators. To prevent these hatreds from ripening into violence, as this article will discuss,^[50] Kosovo authorities and civil society organizations must pursue more immediate action than a diplomatic strategy will yield to support families of the missing and resolve, as best as possible, their complex emotions of ambiguous loss.^[51]

Past and Present Efforts

I. Multiple Groups in Kosovo Focus on Finding Missing Persons

Strong interest from government, civil society groups, and international NGOs is helping drive forward the cause of missing persons in Kosovo.^[52] The networks built by these groups have the benefit of putting into place strong infrastructure for investigative efforts and building ties with relevant groups, such as associations of families of the missing.^[53] The infrastructure currently in place could enable Kosovo to repurpose its existing missing persons-efforts into programs that better fit the needs of families.^[54]

Multiple government bodies in Kosovo dedicate themselves to finding missing persons.^[55] The Kosovo Commission on Missing Persons, a government body, coordinates activities carried out by local and international actors on the issue of missing persons.^[56] The Commission also processes initial reports of missing persons.^[57] The Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office—after receiving authority from EULEX—maintains the power to “obtain[] court orders for the exhumation of missing persons” in Kosovo.^[58] Another government body, the Institute of Forensic Medicine (IFM) functions as Kosovo’s “public authority for providing . . . medical death investigation expertise,” and carries out exhumations and hand-overs of human remains.^[59]

As the Background section notes, international bodies lead Kosovo’s efforts to find the remains of missing persons, while the Kosovar government plays a supervisory and coordinating role.^[60] The European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) maintains the official mandate to oversee this work,^[61] although Kosovar authorities are assuming a greater partnership role.^[62] EULEX partners with IFM, the government body noted above, to carry out forensic pathology activities and investigations of crime scenes, as well as to provide forensic science training for staff.^[63] The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), a treaty-based intergovernmental organization, partners with governments, including Kosovo’s, in locating missing persons, engaging civil society, and developing “appropriate expressions of commemoration and tribute to the missing.”^[64] Significantly, the ICMP also lobbies government bodies “to deliver social and economic support” to families of the missing.^[65]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also provides support for cooperative efforts with political leaders in Belgrade.^[66] Over the years, the ICRC has pushed Prishtina and Belgrade (the capital cities of Kosovo and Serbia, respectively) to “provide information that may help to elucidate the fate” of the wartime missing.^[67] The ICRC also maintains a continually updated list of missing persons containing numbers agreed upon by Belgrade and Prishtina delegations to the ICRC.^[68] The ICRC has been at the forefront of carrying out psychological support programs for families of the missing in other countries, especially Sri Lanka and Nepal.^[69] Because ICRC already has a presence in Kosovo, it may be possible to implement a similar intervention, especially if the Committee were to partner with local NGOs to reach impacted families.^[70]

II. The Primary Obstacle to Fully Resolving the Missing Persons Issue is Kosovo’s Strained Relationship with Serbia

Because Serbian forces were largely the perpetrators of enforced disappearances and the creation of mass graves, the Serbian government controls critical information important toward finding persons, such as the precise location of gravesites and the status of human remains covertly removed from Kosovo and taken into Serbia.^[71]

Joint efforts by Serbia and Kosovo to share information on the location of missing persons remain elusive.^[72] The European Union has led efforts to forge a workable agreement between the two countries, but to little effect.^[73] Throughout 2021 and 2022, Kosovar and Serbian media touted the possibility of Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksander Vucic signing a framework (the Brussels Agreement) to normalize relations, including an understanding to jointly find wartime missing persons.^[74] However, tensions flared during rounds of negotiation, and a deal was not concluded.^[75] Other matters that figured largely in the negotiations, including a contentious license plate debate between Kosovo and Serbia, make it seem unlikely that the two countries will cooperate on a much more sensitive topic such as missing persons.^[76] In addition to the failure of this latest round of talks, one article notes that “more than 30 agreements [have been] signed” between the two countries in the two decades since the war, with few of those implemented.^[77] Without good-faith efforts by both states, an agreement on missing persons is likely to remain elusive for the foreseeable future.

III. Current Efforts Do Not Fully Address the Needs of Families of the Missing

Current efforts largely focus on finding the remains of missing persons or the mass grave sites where missing persons might be found.^[78] This is mainly due to necessity; without the confirmation of a specific site or that a mass grave exists, for instance, there is no way to identify a person’s remains or to deliver that person’s remains to their surviving family members.^[79] To identify remains, some family members of the missing provide “blood samples for verification.”^[80] Although such contributions are crucial to the identification process, others refuse to provide DNA for analysis.^[81] The potential for re-traumatization is one possible reason. Despite the importance of investigations and “front-end” efforts, there appear to be few, if any, programmatic efforts in Kosovo to provide trauma-informed care for families of the missing. As noted in the discussion of ambiguous loss supra, there may be serious consequences to not doing so.

Kosovo Should Enact a System of Psychological Reparations for Families of the Missing

The previous sections reviewed the damaging long-term effects of the failure to address long-term ambiguous loss. The section after that examined Kosovo’s past and present efforts to find missing persons, and documented promising trends as well as obstacles in these efforts. With this framework in mind, this section suggests a path forward for Kosovo and proceeds in two parts. Part one of this recommendation says that Kosovo faces intractable political and legal obstacles with Serbia in completing missing persons work and should turn inward to provide solutions for impacted families. Although this approach is necessarily more limited, a Kosovo-led and -centered approach would offer the greatest—and most immediate—benefits for impacted families. The next part of this recommendation argues that psychological reparations are the most appropriate way forward. Reparations of any kind are a resource-intensive undertaking. In a cost-benefit analysis of reparations schemes, this section asserts that a reparations program focused on psychological repair would be the most efficient way to bring closure to impacted families and ensure their full reintegration with society. Following this discussion, this paper addresses potential critiques of such an approach and explains why it is still worth pursuing.

I. Kosovo Must Take Political Considerations Into Account and Address the Issue of Missing Persons Unilaterally

Kosovo requires information from Serbia in its effort to find more of its missing persons,and the contentious relationship between the two countries hinders the exchange of that information.^[82] Previously, Serbia’s war crimes prosecutor and Kosovar leaders demonstrated willingness to share information on mass graves of ethnic Albanians found in Serbia, and those of ethnic Serbians in Kosovo.^[83] However, in more recent years, a formalized agreement between the two countries to share complete information has been elusive.^[84]

Based on the track record of the two countries, any path forward on missing persons that involves Kosovo’s reliance on Serbia seems destined to fail. Serbian authorities—and specifically the military—are thought by Kosovo to hold “complete records of the locations of gravesites,”^[85] but refuse to fully open its archives.^[86] Serbia’s reticence to do so may stem from concerns that providing such complete information would open Serbian authorities to legal liability and greater scrutiny on the global stage.^[87] As such, an information-sharing strategy does not seem feasible at this juncture.

As a result, Kosovo must focus on what it can do without relying on Serbia to resolve the issue of missing persons. Doing so may help prevent intergenerational effects of the unique trauma of missing persons.^[88] Furthermore, a system that focuses on more immediate action—rather than the time-delayed process of excavations and identifications—is likely to better serve families of the missing, even if such a solution is imperfect.

II. Providing Psychological Reparations for Families of Missing Persons Should Be the Primary Focus for Kosovo

Current strategies to find and identify missing persons in Kosovo are yielding limited results, primarily due to the political stalemate with Serbia.^[89] Exhumations require extensive planning efforts and identifications of human remains are difficult to make.^[90] Furthermore, the “rate of locating, recovering, and identifying” Kosovo’s missing persons is in decline.^[91] In light of these obstacles, implementing a system of psychological reparations should be the primary focus for Kosovo. Psychological reparations have critical benefits that would outweigh the potential costs. Kosovo largely has the infrastructure in place to reach the families of missing persons, by way of its extensive network of civil society organizations throughout the state.^[92] Existing resources on the ground in Kosovo—office space, staff with the required language abilities, ties to the community—would make it relatively straightforward to implement a program similar to the ICRC’s Accompaniment Program, explained below. Offices of civil society organizations could serve as meeting points for discussion groups for families of the missing and trained staff could be dispatched to the homes of participating family members.^[93] Although implementing a new program would certainly incur some costs, doing so might be less expensive than providing reparations for every impacted family member—a significant concern for a country that “remains one of the poorest places in Europe.”^[94]

Another benefit of instituting psychological reparations is that such a program would offer tangible progress in terms of helping affected families cope with their unique grief. Unlike current efforts marked by political jousting with Serbia, providing psychological support would likely be more immediately accessible to families of the missing, whereas an agreement with Serbia would not necessarily produce quick results for families.^[95]

In addition to the potentially quick deployment of psychological reparations, this kind of system might be less political divisive than other reparations schemes in Kosovo.^[96] Like other post-conflict states in the Balkans, Kosovo has explored various methods of compensating wartime victims.^[97] Kosovo’s efforts, however, show mixed results.^[98] In cases where Kosovo courts convict defendants of war crimes, victims are seldom, if ever, awarded compensation.^[99] The failure of Kosovo’s judicial system to meet the needs of wartime victims may feed perceptions that authorities are not doing enough to meet the needs of vulnerable individuals.

The results for individuals participating in psychological support programs may also be more lasting than a system of cash reparations. As a practical matter, recipients of cash payments will spend the money, but these recipients may still be left with their feelings of complex grief and social isolation, despite the official acknowledgment that the payment would provide.

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[1] Searching for Missing Persons in Kosovo: An Overview of the Work Done so Far, EULEX Kosovo (Aug. 30, 2022), https://eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,10,2634; Azem Kurtic, Vuk Tesija & Perparim Isufi, ‘Where are Our Loved Ones?’ Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo Mark Missing Persons Day, Balkan Trans. Just. (Aug. 30, 2024, 4:12 PM), https://balkaninsight.com/2024/08/30/where-are-our-loved-ones-bosnia-croatia-kosovo-mark-missing-persons-day.

[2] See Emirjeta Vilahiu, Marking National Day of Missing Persons, Kosovo Demands Justice, Prishtina Insight (Apr. 27, 2022, 5:35 PM), https://prishtinainsight.com/marking-national-day-of-missing-persons-kosovo-demands-justice.

[3] Missing Persons, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/protected-persons/missing-persons (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).

[4] Ian McDonald, The ICRC Remains Alarmed About the Unabated Increase in Missing Persons Worldwide, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (Oct. 26, 2022), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-remains-alarmed-about-increase-missing-persons-worldwide.

[5] See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Preliminary Observations the Official Visit to Serbia and Kosovo (22 November to 2 December 2022) (Dec. 2, 2022), Fabian Salvioli, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/truth/statements/2022-12-02/20121202-eom-statement-serbia-kosovo-sr-truth.pdf. For an example of the recovery of human remains from the Kosovo conflict, see Perparim Isufi, War Victims Found in Serbian Mass Grave Repatriated to Kosovo, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (Sept. 30, 2021, 4:51 PM), https://balkaninsight.com/2021/09/30/war-victims-found-in-serbian-mass-grave-repatriated-to-kosovo.

[6] See Vilahiu, supra note 2.

[7] Xhorxhina Bami & Milica Stojanovic, Delay to Kosovo-Serbia Deal Upsets Wartime Missing Persons’ Families, Balkan Insight (July 21, 2022, 4:56 PM), https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/21/wartime-missing-persons-families-upset-by-delay-to-kosovo-serbia-deal (“‘The [Kosovo] government did not stick to its words because it pledged the missing persons issue would be a priority on the negotiating table but in around 15 months they have talked about everything else but the missing persons, including license plates and energy.’”).

[8] Pauline Boss, Families of the Missing: Psychosocial Effects and Therapeutic Approaches, 99 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 519, 519 (2017) (defining the concept of “ambiguous loss”).

[9] See, e.g., Amila Isuru, Padmakumara Bandmithra & S. S. Williams, Locked in Grief: A Qualitative Study of Grief Among Family Members of Missing Persons in Southern Sri Lanka, 167 BMC Psych. 2 (2021); Naomi Kinsella & Soren Blau, Searching for Conflict Related Missing Persons in Timor-Leste: Technical, Political and Cultural Considerations, 2 Stability: Int’l J. Sec. and Dev. 1 (2013). For an example of how families become involved in searching for missing loved ones, see Paulina Villegas & Reis Thebault, All Over Ukraine, People are Missing, Forcing Families to Become Detectives, Wash. Post (June 19, 2022, 12:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/19/people-missing-ukraine-russia-invasion.

[10] See infra, Section 1.2, Section 1.3.

[11] See infra, Section 1.3 (expanding on the psychological effects of ambiguous loss).

[12] See Kosovo Profile—Timeline, BBC News (Nov. 25, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18331273. For an illustration of how tensions between Kosovo and Serbia persist, see Fatos Bytyci, Serbs in Kosovo Clash With Police as Ethnic Tensions Flare, Reuters (Dec. 11, 2022, 2:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbs-kosovo-block-roads-clash-with-police-ethnic-tensions-worsen-2022-12-11.

[13] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, Missing Persons from the Kosovo Conflict and its Aftermath: A Stocktaking, 2017, 12 (2017), https://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Kosovo-stocktaking-ENG.pdf.

[14] Id.

[15] Kosovo, World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kosovo (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).

[16] Id.

[17] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 13, at 12.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 13, at 12.

[24] CIA, supra note 15.

[25] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 13, at 12.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 13.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 12.

[30] Id. at 3.

[31] UNMIK, United Nations Mission in Kosovo,https://unmik.unmissions.org (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).

[32] Justice Section, United Nations Mission in Kosovo, https://unmik.unmissions.org/justice-section (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).

[33] About EULEX, European Union Rule of Law Mission, https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,60 (last visited Dec. 11, 2022).

[34] Id.

[35] Id. See infra, Section I.4 (discussing EULEX’s and other organizations’ efforts on finding Kosovo’s missing persons).

[36] See Boss, supra note 8, at 519.

[37] See Id; see also Isuru, supra note 9, at 9.

[38] Boss, supra note 8, at 519.

[39] Email from Shpresa Ibrahimi, Attorney, Civil Rights Program Kosovo, to Valerie Brankovic, Author, William & Mary Law School (Oct. 7, 2022, 6:44 AM) (on file with author).

[40] This proposition was inspired by a discussion with Dr. James Waller about the high risk for the recurrence of conflict in the absence of measures to support post-conflict healing and reconciliation. Interview with James E. Waller, Cohen Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Keene State College, in Williamsburg, Va. (Oct. 5, 2022).

[41] See id.

[42] One transmission mechanism comes in the form of traumatized elders teaching younger generations to be distrustful of authorities and outsiders (e.g., the example of an indigenous family instructing their children not to ask for help because it will be dangerous). Over time, these lessons may calcify into feelings of alienation, depression, and disconnection from society. Tori DeAngelis, The Legacy of Trauma, 50 Monitor on Psych. 1 (2019), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2019/02/legacy-trauma.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Kosovo recalls war victims on National Missing Person’s Day, Associated Press (Apr. 27, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/kosovo-government-and-politics-europe-missing-persons-ba17f451b69360286c770dce57466be3.

[46] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Missing Persons: A Handbook for Parliamentarians 1 (2009), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_1117.pdf.

[47] Boss, supra note 8, at 525.

[48] Waller, supra note 39.

[49] See infra Section I.4.ii (discussing how the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia makes any immediate progress on the missing persons issue unlikely).

[50] See Infra Section II.

[51] Waller, supra note 39. Another important aspect of post-conflict rebuilding (outside the scope of this paper) is how a state’s government memorializes and teaches the conflict for future generations. Incendiary narratives that focus on only one sides version of the conflict probably do little to help communities reconcile in the aftermath of violent conflict, whereas truth-seeking activities (such as a thoughtfully designed truth commission) may be more likely to build a healthier foundation for reconciliation.

[52] See, e.g.,Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, Kosovo Guide for Families of the Missing: Institutions, Process, and Rights of the Families (2016), https://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/English-Guide-final-WEB.pdf.

[53] Id.

[54] See infra Section II.2.

[55] Id.

[56] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 52, at 2.

[57] Id. at 12.

[58] Id. at 3.

[59] Id.

[60] Id.

[61] European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo—Civilian Mission, EULEX Kosovo (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eulex-kosovo/eulex-kosovo-european-union-rule-law-mission-kosovo-civilian-mission_en?s=333#:~:text=EULEX%20is%20a%20rule%20of,standards%20and%20best%20European%20practices.

[62] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 52, at 3.

[63] Id. 

[64] Id. at 4.

[65] Id.

[66] Id. at 5.

[67] Id.

[68] Int’l Comm’n on Missing Persons, supra note 52, at 5.

[69] See infra Section II.3 (detailing the strategies and impacts behind the ICRC’s Accompaniment Programs in Nepal and Sri Lanka).

[70] Id.

[71] See, e.g., Kurti-Vučić meeting in question over wartime missing people, European Western Balkans (Sept. 9, 2021), https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2021/09/09/kurti-vucic-meeting-in-question-over-wartime-missing-people.

[72] Id.

[73] Kosovo Recalls War Victims on National Missing Person’s Day, Associated Press (Apr. 27, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/kosovo-government-and-politics-europe-missing-persons-ba17f451b69360286c770dce57466be3.

[74] See European Western Balkans, supra note 71.

[75] Ned Price, Department Press Briefing—October 24, 2022, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 24, 2022), https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-october-24-2022.

[76] Petković: “Kurti Delivered a Fatal Blow to the Brussels Agreement,” B92 (Nov. 4, 2022), https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=11&dd=04&nav_id=114800.

[77] European Western Balkans, supra note 71.

[78] See William D. Haglund et al., The Archaeology of Contemporary Mass Graves, 35 Hist.  Archaeology 57, 57 (2000).

[79] See id.

[80] Sylejman Kllokoqi & Llazar Semini, Experts Seek Blood Samples to Identify Kosovo War Missing, Wash. Post (Aug. 30, 2020, 8:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/experts-seek-blood-samples-to-identify-kosovo-war-missing/2020/08/30/0d4834f2-eac0-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html; see Serbeze Haxhiaj, Father’s Wartime Disappearance Motivates Kosovo’s Missing Persons Chief, Balkan Insight (Aug. 23, 2021), https://balkaninsight.com/2021/08/23/fathers-wartime-disappearance-motivates-kosovos-missing-persons-chief/.

[81] Kllokoqi, supra note 80.

[82] See supra Section I.4.ii.

[83] B92, supra note 76.

[84] U.N., Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on its Visit to Serbia, including Kosovo (19 – 26 June, 2014), Report Submitted by the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/38/Add. 1 (2015).

[85] Id.

[86] See id. (discussing potential reasons Serbia and Kosovo have not shared complete information with each other because“[a]nother difficulty is the reluctance of witnesses to provide information owing to threats, intimidating, a sense of loyalty or the fear that they might implicate themselves in a crime.”) (emphasis added).

[87] See id.

[88] See supra Section I.3.

[89] See Supra Section I.1.

[90] See Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, supra note 84.

[91] Rsch. Inst. of Development and European Aff., The Issue of Missing Persons in the Content of an Eventual ‘Grand Finale’ Between Kosovo and Serbia 1 (2019), https://www.ridea-ks.org/Articles/3/Images/29-01-2019/433438_The_Issue_of_Missing_Persons_in_the_context_of_an_eventual_’Grand_Finale’_between_Kosovo_and_Serbia.pdf.

[92] See infra Section II. 

[93] See infra Section II.2. Both of these activities were part of the Accompaniment Programs in Sri Lanka and Nepal.

[94] Annual Report 2021, UNICEF Kosovo Programme (2022), https://www.unicef.org/kosovoprogramme/reports/annual-report-2021.

[95] See Serbeze Haxhiaj, Kosovo War Crime Victims Failing to Get Compensation, Official Warns, Balkan Transitional Just. (Feb. 7, 2022, 7:47 AM), https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/07/kosovo-war-crime-victims-failing-to-get-compensation-official-warns.

[96] See Reparations—Analysis and Opinion, Balkan Insight, https://balkaninsight.com/balkan-transitional-justice-home/reparations-analysis-and-opinion (last visited Sept. 8, 2024).

[97] See id.

[98] See id.

[99] Haxhiaj, supra note 95.

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